Перейти к содержимому

lost season 1 episode 13 subtitles torrent

In today's world up to 35−40 international and internationalized regional conflicts involving the use of military force take place every year. World. Screened by a schizophrenic torrent of state-sponsored propaganda, the Kremlin maintained innocence, distancing Russia from the controversial events and.

Рубрика: Witch hunter robin subtitles torrent

valdai putin subtitles torrent

Our analysis shows that both the US President Donald Trump and Russia's President Vladimir Putin instrumentalise hierarchical gendered identities to securitise. The Russian government interfered in the presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government. This ideological void triggered a torrent of ideas and distorted historical narratives that swooped on Russian society. That is why the process of ideological. TOMB RAIDER 2012 DOWNLOAD TORENT FREE The site where regularly on a. For more details, the best results. Text of the be also used leverage a metro-cluster advised to be.

Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has overshadowed many other problems. While the opposing leaders are still capable of reaching some agreement, common nationalists — especially militant nationalists — are 6 Many ultra-right-wing supporters chose the Azov Battalion for a reason — its core is made up of Ukrainian neo-Nazis.

This much has become obvious from the record low number of participants in the Russian March event in November Sova centre It is important to note that, although existing Russian nationalist organisations are growing weaker, new and stronger ones have not been established or inspired from the top.

The Kremlin has not established any special organisations to air its new policy, apart from the aforementioned National Liberation Movement, which is rather insignificant. The policy is being implemented by the Kremlin itself, its United Russia party and affiliated groups. This means that supporting the presidential policy requires no subtleties.

On the other hand, we can see that the number of racist attacks is not going down. According to our preliminary estimates, at least people have suffered from violence motivated by xenophobia or neo-Nazism this year; 19 of them died. These figures are bound to increase even more. Therefore, radical right wing forces may sharply intensify their activity here in Russia in yet another aftermath of this war. Although we cannot predict the nature or mechanisms of that activity at this stage, it remains a very realistic possibility.

The Lyublino event gathered around 1, people, and the other one, around 1,, according to the SOVA Center estimates. The approach has been studies, analyses and interpretations of primarily Russian sources as prominent Russian journals, but also Western analyses and interpretations of contemporary Russian warfighting discussions. Theoretical considerations are limited to the period from the s to the present day — The driving force in the Russian development of her warfighting capability is based on how the national threat perception directly or indirectly influences the conditions for political affairs and conducting of military operations and activities.

Soviet and Russian military theorists have a common tradition of belief in depth operations where science and technology have an influence on the success of a war Ogarkov , Savkin Technology and science generate products and systems that directly affect and change threats, military capabilities and abilities. Technological and scientific developments are important factors for military concepts, long-term defence planning, and the development of military doctrine and capabilities.

Furthermore, the coordination of Russian civil resources with Russian military capabilities 1 Based on Mattsson, P, A. Stockholm: Swedish Defence University. This Russian dialectical development occurs sequentially and in parallel at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels Blank New technology is crucial to this type of warfare, particularly electronics, and information and communications technology.

Sixth generation warfare has three main objectives: 1 Defeating an opponent's armed forces in his own territory , 2 Destroying an opponent's economic activity and potential — and 3 Subverting or changing an opponent's political system. Russian criticism of this theory initially took the form of emphasis on and expressions of technical and scientific determinism read also the prioritisation of space, air and naval forces over ground forces.

War can be waged against all enemy territory and even beyond the boundaries of the operational area. The goal is to attack the political and military leadership in order to quickly achieve the stated political and military strategic objectives Slipchenko The use of various capabilities is optimised to create effects at as high a level as possible. Indirect and asymmetric means and methods are used in advance of the operation, in order to identify and effectively influence the opponent's weaknesses during the preparation for and conduct of operations.

In this new form of warfare, war does not stop; it occurs continuously as preparation for war with varying intensity and centres of gravity Vinogradov Appropriate military strategic means are used to create a favourable strategic position and operational environment. Firstly, it is attacked from within with psychological warfare, information warfare and agents of influence. Remote weapons come from all dimensions.

The fight against an opponent is launched from space, air, land, sea and from under the sea, preferably coordinated in time and space. Key political leadership, vital societal infrastructure, regional leadership functions and military infrastructure are neutralised, or destroyed if possible, across the operational area. In the recent debate about new generation warfare, cultural and existential war has emerged as an important complement to the kinetic, contactless and remote war. In sixth generation warfare the various phases are conducted both sequentially and in parallel.

In conclusion, the new generation of warfare is said to have had an evolutionary development and to be based on Soviet military theoretical thinking between the s and the late s. Hybrid concepts have emerged during the last ten years and were initially limited to a tactical perspective on irregular warfare. However, concepts have gradually broadened and taken on a more strategic nature, which has led to some including economic and political factors, and the media.

Sixth generation warfare has evolved in the period and consideration has been given to the experience of globalisation, the New World Order,2 new scientific achievements and applications, not least in the fields of science and technology. The strength of sixth generation warfare is its 2 See for example, Kissinger, H. World Order. The goals are political, the means are national syntheses, the methods are combinations of tradition and innovation, and the risks lie in how surprise and initial force can be balanced Morozov In Sweden, hybrid warfare has primarily been linked to a method of warfare that combines various strategies, tactics and combat techniques in the same area of conflict.

Actors have access to both regular and irregular military capabilities. Particular emphasis is put on how actors make use of communications, the mass media, command and control, support and access to sophisticated weapons systems, which means that those actors pose a hybrid threat — and are difficult opponents. In US descriptions many have tried to use the terms hybrid threat and hybrid warfare to cover almost every complexity of war and its grey areas from civil conflict to full-scale war.

The direction of Russian strategic thinking is based on the country's socio-economic development, national security strategy, foreign policy concepts and strategies for the development of the Russian Arctic zone, and security policy up to Russia advocates a multipolar world with several regional centres of power, instead of the unipolar world of today with strong American military, economic and political dominance.

The destabilisation of countries neighbouring Russia and internal unrest and fragile stabilisation in Russia [by other countries] are perceived as serious threats. Information and communication technology is said to constitute a threat to world peace. The doctrine describes the characteristics of current military conflicts The Military Doctrine of the Federation of Russia They are conclusions drawn from previous Russian studies of contemporary wars and there may be links to the Defence Plan.

In his book there are ideas about war and warfare, beyond sixth generation warfare, which involve means such as missiles in all dimensions, non-lethal weapons, and new weapons derived from scientific advances, based on nanotechnology and genetic engineering. He states that the length of the armed phase decreases because it represents the completion of attack operations, which are preceded by diversionary operations against a nation's civil society, political leadership and the population, and reinforced by information warfare and psychological warfare.

Precision weapons, with greater precision, countermeasures and increased kinetic effect, along with a greater ability, in near real time, to identify and analyse political and military strategic goals are swiftly, and not unexpectedly, of decisive significance at the beginning of the military phase of a war.

This also requires Special Forces and agents deep in an opponent's territory. A greater capability for diversionary operations is also needed. Vladimirov predicts a sharp increase in precision weapons, an increase in non-lethal means and unmanned military craft that can be autonomous and armed. Operational and strategic mobility is increased through improvements in the performance of weapon systems and platforms Vladimirov The character of the new war is developed by Major General Alexander Vladimirov from a clear distinction between peace and war between nations, to a permanent war as a natural part of a nation's existence.

The previously clear boundary between war and peace blurs into a transitional state of insecurity and fear of war. The first change is a shift from war about territory to war of an existential nature. The second change is a transition from war to destroy and annihilate to the exertion of political, economic and cultural influence.

The third change is the transition from a war of direct military engagements to a contactless war. As the strategy is no longer destruction, intimidation and annihilation, so the direct use of military means is not the most important method used against other military means. Instead the strategy becomes the use of means for indirect action where the goal is to create organised chaos. Methods can include several variants of the generations of warfare. These objectives require means that provide direct influence over an opponent politicians, the military and the population , internal collapse to influence the opponent's national elite , a proactive cultural war through various mass media and agents of influence, a war in depth using special forces and commercial irregular forces, and the pursuit of a war about the understanding of war and psychological warfare.

War against an opponent must, therefore, be understood as a total war continuing with varying degrees of intensity and on several concurrent lines of operation. War is waged within an opponent's territory using subversive and diversionary operations, which are then complemented with remote attacks — from land, the air, the seas and from space — when the strategic and operational conditions are favourable Vladimirov This article has described how the Russian military thinking and development of warfare has evolved from Soviet and Russian war experiences from the s to the 21st Century combined with some brilliant ideas of military theorists.

The Russians present a different — and for westerners — a challenging way of military thinking and perception of war. War is based on Russian national interests; its historical, cultural and geopolitical position. In the revised Russian military doctrine December 25, information and psychological warfare are describes as both military threat and danger. Especially, patriotic upbringing of youth in Russia is one of the mechanisms to protect the population against western information war.

Another mechanism is to work with historical education and present Russian history in positive view. A specific focus should be upon the positive portrayal of Soviet history. The Modern Russian warfare is a synthesis of all national assets and it is led from the new National Command Centre in Moscow, where all important civilian authorities and institutions are subordinated to the General of the Army Valerij Gerasimov, chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, in crises and war.

The Russian build-up of military capabilities and aggressive military interventions in Ukraine has shown a new threat for the western countries. Many have misunderstood and underestimated the Russian military thought, capabilities, and intentions.

The threat is a combination of an indirect and direct approach, a combination of asymmetric and symmetric means, as well as a combination of soft and hard methods. Western countries must meet these Russian threats by a national coordination by civilian and military defence, as well as a broad international political and military cooperation. Orbis, Summer 94, Vol.

FitzGerald, M, C. Washington, D. Huntington, S, P. Kissinger, H. Four experts weigh in. European Leadership Network. McCulloh, T. Hybrid Warfare. JSOU Report. Savkin, V. A Soviet View. Honolulu, HI. Slipchenko, V. Voiny Novogo Pokolenia — Distantsionnye i Bezkontaktnye.

Moskva: Olma-Press. Slipchenko, Vladimir. Voyna budushchego - Shestoye pokoleniye. Moskva: Nongovernmental Science Foundation. The Military Doctrine of the Federation of Russia Vladimirov, A. At least in theory, it follows that conceptual capability should be regarded as the crucial link between the physical and moral capabilities of a given military actor, as it concerns the ability of the actor to operationalise ideas about how to conduct modern warfare.

At its core, the document leaves any would be Cold War warrior or alarmist disappointed. But how relevant is the politics-of-scale question about a return to global cold-war structures, and to which countries? Admittedly, in Soviet military parlance doctrine was everything, and rightly analysed as such by Western observers Glantz But does military innovation flow only from state policy and political leadership in Russia today?

What can we learn from the other two-thirds of its conceptual capability, i. Focusing on doctrine and summarily disrespecting their innovative capacity in military terms, are we reading the Russians right? This article taps into an ongoing research project at the Swedish Defence College in Stockholm, Evolving Russian Military Capability, to which the author is an affiliated researcher. The period under consideration is , as the first year represents a fresh editorial start for the main public journal of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Voyennaya Mysl henceforth: VM , also translated from Russian and published in the US as Military Thought.

The journal has been analysed in the original language, and the responsibility for any errors concerning interpretation, translation or conjecture thus lies with the author. The state-science nexus in contemporary Russia There is a formal division of labour between the civil and military sciences in Russia. Civil research is guided by the influential Russian Academy of Sciences, under the auspices of which universities can still by and large be seen as mass teaching units. Military research is steered by the Military Scientific Committee, which is directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Hence, there are also similarities between the civil and military producers of knowledge and research in Russia since both spheres are elitist and detach research from teaching and education Graham , Russian Academy of Sciences , Ministry of Defence A significant difference between the civil and military sectors is that the state holds direct sway over scientific work on the military side through the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff. This state of affairs is rarely or never debated in public or in the Russian media.

Regarding civil research, however, state control is indirect and mostly exercised via budgetary measures. Another difference is that the corruption and conservatism of the academy and the consequences for the Russian system of higher education and research belong to a recurrent theme in the Russian public debate.

So much so that international observers are struck by the force and intensity of arguments cf. Kurilla Loren Graham is the western scholar who has perhaps most persistently tried to follow the development of science in Russia. Graham , p. Whereas the accumulation of knowledge in the fields of for example literature, history and art have been constantly subjected to authoritarian interference, particularly under the aegis of tsars and communists, the technical and natural sciences have been able to foster a certain relative autonomy by the power of mathematics and objectifying principles of study.

This has also allowed researchers in the fields of science and technology a constant element of interaction with their western counterparts. For Graham, however, innovation is defined by the ability among scientists to operationalise research results into ideas and products that can be put on the market and, thus, contribute to the economic growth and welfare of a nation.

Graham fails to find this type of innovativeness in Russia generally, but he also points to some areas that are difficult to interpret. In nuclear technology, space technology and computerization political control and steering have yielded positive results Graham , p. Whereas the Soviet Union laid the foundation for Russian prominence in the fields of nuclear and space, however, it completely missed the beat regarding the early stages of computerisation.

He maintains that Russian universities, institutes and other scientific establishments continue to produce human talent. He also describes how the propensity for large-scale national projects aimed at organising and financing top notch research and science spills over into present-day Russia p.

As a whole, he concludes, the Russian system of higher education and research continues to produce geniuses in a vacuum because of the blatant lack of political, social, legal and economic support for marketable innovation p. Again, he seems mystified by those scientific areas in which Russian science is able to compensate for what by western standards looks like its constant structural shortcomings. Still, Graham concludes, the Russian system is at the forefront of nuclear and space technology and by extension how knowledge in these fields contributes to the development of modern weapons.

Also, with regard to the cumbersome experience from early computerisation, Russia seems to have been able to skip a phase in the evolution of computer hardware, compensating heavily by foreign import and rapid and expansive evolution in the development, design and application of software p. Thus, Russian science is competitive in at least three areas of significant military interest. Five aspects of the current military-scientific debate Looking at the military-theoretical debate in VM after , more than 20 articles discuss the role and function of military science in Russia.

In an effort to collate the different arguments and perspectives in , colonel N. Vasilyev presents his opinion that the debate on military science has been too much focused on the delimitation of military research VM , p. The reason, according to Vasilyev, is that too many influential individuals in the field have emphasised armed struggle and combat as the core of military knowledge.

Instead, he says, broader social, technical, and scientific perspectives should be applied to military issues since no meaningful boundaries can be drawn between combat and other forms of struggle in modern warfare. Whether or not Russian military science has a core of knowledge, consisting of the prerequisites for and successful implementation of armed struggle, is major bone of contention from onwards. High- ranking military officers and academics argue over the issue in a debate which seems to be fuelled by the concurrent intensification of Russian military reform.

The relative strengths and shortcomings of the military academic system are also debated in relative openness, some arguing that military science is in a crisis situation, particularly targeting the issue of whether or not a renewal of theories, approaches or methods is necessary to achieve the goals of the military reform policy aimed at VM ,10,11; VM 5,10,12; VM 10, VM 9. Opinions about whether or not Russian military science is in a crisis, or not, however pale by the side of arguments concerning the character, role and function of modern warfare.

In the following, the arguments are reduced to five different perspectives illustrative of how the debate has evolved over time. First off, there is the idea that Russian military science is well organised and competitive in terms of knowledge, but that it suffers from an over- emphasis on the role of history and past experience for modern warfare. Major General I. Vorobyev and Colonel V. Kiselyev, both with doctorates in military science, are frequent participants in the debate.

Their argument is that Russian military science is unique in having an extensive knowledge base in its historical experiences from war, but that it is currently over-emphasising the study of history, collective national experiences and relative successes and failures in wars of the past VM p. In their view, this has made the Russian system for military analysis vulnerable to oversight and partially blocked its capability to embrace the realities of 6th and 7th generation warfare.

A second position in this debate focuses on the demerits of Soviet military terminology and how it casts a long shadow over current military analysis in Russia. The moral importance and ponderousness of the Soviet military heritage is nowhere in question but, as illustrated by N. Ilichev, its conceptual and theoretical aspects are VM In this light, the Soviet assumption that social and economic developments are linear and stable is particularly problematic, since present-day structures are inherently unstable.

In an encompassing article, Vorobyev and Kiselyev also follow this line of thought, saying that the role of military doctrine therefore has changed and that the real challenge for current Russian military science is to observe some critical distance between how political and economic knowledge is transformed into military doctrine on the one hand, and on the other hand military science can make judgements about developments in the world VM 8, p.

The authors go on to enumerate examples of how they see Russian military science as lagging behind the US and NATO because of its reluctance to incorporate technical, scientific and social-scientific innovation with the conceptualisation of modern warfare. Vorobyev and Kiseljev also think that Russian military science could have a greater influence over military doctrine if the current spearheading action of the Russian government and the Armed Forces, i.

New technologies, net-centric and information warfare, electronic operations and joint leadership structures lie at the core of modern warfare, and the argument is that Russian military science lags behind other state institutions in this realisation at its own peril.

A third position in the debate on Russian military science is represented by equally frequent participants V. Kopytko and A. The thrust of their argument is that no clear boundaries, analytical or otherwise, can be drawn between military and social change VM To them, however, the issue is methodological.

Furthermore, they argue that the ability to contribute to different kinds of prognosis about social, political and economic change is a success factor. According to Kopytko and Kopylov, this can be achieved only as the result of a sharper methodological discussion and revamping of how military science in Russia is delineated, inspired and focused on particular areas of research p.

It is interesting to note that Kopytko and Kopylov take their methodological argument very far. They only glance over the doctrinal aspect of military science, while fully focusing their attention on the world of science. Indeed, far from just talking about methodological choices within the field of military science, they actually conceptualise how the ultimate break with Soviet terminology in which military doctrine steers military science, cf. Glantz can be achieved by a conceptual shift in which philosophy of science guides military science.

Considering the significant influence on the modernisation of military theory in Russia, particularly of V. Kopytko, the argument merits special mention here: Hence, military science cannot wholeheartedly study various forms of preparation for and implementation of armed struggle without deeper knowledge about the socio-economic and military- political aspects of war, nor without knowledge about those laws prescribed by materialist dialectics.

VM , p. To his eyes, it is easy to accept the notion that Russian military science can be more inspired by science in general and by certain innovations in particular. However, he argues, this does not lead to any significant changes in the objects of study or, indeed, terminology of Russian military science. Doctrinal steering, Fomov argues, is rather uninteresting since Russian military science already shares its place in Russian society and development with the civilian sciences.

Times may change, says Fomov, and perhaps some objects of study within the field of military science, but at the end of the day the forte of Russian military science is its constant refusal to succumb to postmodernist theories and perspectives. Kopylov returns with an article on how the American usage of the term national security has changed over time. Regardless of his polemical, perhaps politically motivated, keenness to show similarities between the US and Russian governments, his point is that militarily successful Western governments have moved from doctrinal thinking based on ideas about military security to doctrinal thinking based on national security VM , p.

Kopylov, a Ph. Directly addressing the Russian national strategy cf. Vladimirov , pp. But they take on a particular sharpness in the light of the global movement towards post- industrial, information society. Golubyev, V. Grin and V. Kargin argue that the debate on military science in Russia has less to do with methodology, the postmodern varieties of which are well known and utilized by a plethora of analysts in the Russian military-scientific system, and more with the lack of a systematic quality assessment.

Chekinov and S. The new terminology merits some attention from Western scholars in and of itself, but two aspects of the schema are of particular interest here. The first is the overall emphasis on coordination and cooperation between different areas of science and research, civilian and military, where Chekinov and Bogdanov reduce the role of strategic, operational and tactical military theory historically the theories of Russian military art to just one of several interfacing elements, including civil research in the social, natural and technical sciences.

Perhaps even more interesting is their reduction of the role of military doctrine to just another factor contributing to better military science. Their schema would, according to Chekinov and Bogdanov, simply codify a system of knowledge production which is already in place, given their view of what changes have taken place in Russian state and society: Thus, in the evolutionary development of military art at the beginning of the 21st century the core role will be played by all of its component and interacting theories and disciplines, of other methods of struggle, above all non-military measures and indirect effects and their elements—military cleverness and instantaneity.

A special place in this process is reserved for military science, which decides the basic trajectories, causalities in the development of military art. It specifies causal dependencies in military affairs, gives practical recommendations with regard to military practice in our VS armed forces and the other military structures of the country. Some of the names referred to here can sometimes be seen also in other public media, but more often than not the discussion on military doctrine, knowledge and science is limited to fewer sources.

Postmodernity is firmly relegated to elements of behaviour in society, which is in line with what the civil Russian literature on philosophy of science has to say cf. Lebedeva , Lebedev This leads the discussion onto two different paths, where one addresses the problem of how military knowledge and science should be organised, and the other whether or not social phenomena that might be construed as postmodern should lead to a change in, or redefinition of, the military-scientific objects of study.

Importantly, the information sphere is considered one such analytical space. On closer scrutiny, the debate mirrors a particular view of what constitutes scientific innovation. The adherence of the debaters to the uniqueness of Russian national interests is, albeit not outspokenly so, staggeringly close. The Russian national strategy, as formulated by for example A.

Vladimirov , p. But what does innovation mean in military terms? Returning briefly to the full concept of modern military capability, is the current Western discussion perhaps too focused upon the physical mostly technological and moral aspects of modern warfare? At this juncture, it seems as if the Russian discussion on military science gives us at least the incentive to further research the potential privatization of Russian security forces and the development of private security companies.

Drawing on the debate about military knowledge and science in Russia, it could be seen as a game changer for at least two fields of global military interest. Among Russian military experts, the discussion about how Russian military interests might be forwarded by the use of private military companies is already under way VM , pp. What is not being discussed, in Russia or elsewhere, is how military privatization might be a game changer also in scientific innovation.

At the base, at least where it stands in , the Russian debate on military science throws out an interesting analytical challenge. Although it is difficult to know whether or not military thinkers like Chekinov and Bogdanov are simply trying to mask incompetence with conceptual eloquence, there is food for thought in their effort. If their relative denouncement of military doctrine in Russia as the ultimate guide to our understanding of current and future military action has any substance, then particularly neighbouring countries will ignore the innovative potential of Russian conceptual capability at their peril.

Bibliography Barany, Zoltan. Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Harlow: Pearson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Glantz, David. London: Frank Cass. Graham, Loren. Science in Russia and the Soviet Union. A Short History. Science in the New Russia. Crisis, Aid, Reform. Lonely Ideas. Can Russia Compete? Cambridge, Mass. Stockholm: FOI. Binaries in Battle. Representations of Division and Conflict.

Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Russian Federation Short term prognosis. Research report in the series Politica, University Press of Estonia. Lebedev, Sergey. Filosofiya Nauky. Moskva: Jurajt. Lebedeva, S. Moskva: Gaudeamus. London: SAGE. McDermott, Roger. The Jamestown Foundation. Tsygankov, A. Moskva: Alfa-M. Osnovyi Obschey Teoryi Voynyi. Moskva: Universitet Sinergia. Almost nobody took it seriously.

Today the situation is different with more and more specialists and officials pointing at the Russian army and recognising it as an emerging threat. How did this happen that we became caught in surprise again?

Why did nobody pay any attention to what was going on in the Russian Army, or if somebody did, why nobody took them seriously. Those and other questions still remain to be answered. Already in the beginning of it became obvious that this reform was different. At the same time a number of indicators also showed that the reform had reached a point where it was not possible to return back.

I already presented my thoughts regarding this in my studies of Petraitis and Petraitis In this article and presentation I will repeat only some which according my point of view are the most evident and important. Other things I am going to discuss here are related to new evidence and recent changes in the Russian military. I am still convinced that the recent reform is different compared to previous ones. Firstly, it was theoretically based and field tested.

Secondly from the beginning it has been seriously run with no indications showing that the political leadership is going to give up. I still argue that the true reform started far before its official announcement in October It started as soon as the military doctrine of was announced.

To get this implemented the General Staff developed an entire plan, which was presented to the MOD board in September The plan was made after deep analysis of a transformation which had been done in the US military five—six years before and which allowed the US to perform outstandingly in Iraq and other following wars and missions.

It proposed a drastic change. In the process of the reform it was foreseen to dismantle an entire old Soviet type Army and to build new military forces. They had to be very similar to the USA forces. They had to be a new generation forces, fully reshaped and able to conduct military operations and other missions differently. The proposal was so revolutionary that a great number of former Soviet generals refused to support it at that time.

Ivanov stepped back by offering to name all this as an experiment and to do more theory testing in the fields and HQs. But at the same time he stated that the reform would take place at any cost and as a result of the change hundreds of generals would be retired. It will be able to fight successfully simultaneously two military conflicts on any type and to participate in one peacekeeping type operation alone or together with international force by using only forces of constant combat readiness without any mobilization and preparation actions.

The first ones will be the forces ready to fight any time and the second ones will be the framework allowing the first one to exit and operate. Proposals had been tested for more than two years. To get the right people to test the reform, and later to implement it, all personnel appointments were concentrated in hands of Army General N.

Under his supervision a strange appointing policy was adopted and kept until the official beginning of the reform. Bulgakov, A. Postnikov, N. Tkachov, A. Zelin, Vice-admirals V. Mardusin, N. Maksimov, K. Sedenko were conducting reform tests in a newly created experimental HQ headed by N.

Tkachov and during exercises in Siberia and other places. Those, appointed by the minister, like Admiral V. Visockij or General-colonels V. Gerasimov or N. Makarov still had to prove their loyalty and only later were reappointed by the President. As soon as the reform was launched officially this practice ended. As has already been mentioned the new military had to be split into operational and institutional forces.

The first ones were supposed to have a three level C2: a joint strategic command JSC in strategic level, an operational command OC in operational level and a brigade in tactical level. The new brigade with its four artillery battalions and antiaircraft artillery element was designed to have its fire support capabilities almost the same as previous division had.

The reform has been run in stages. A majority of operational forces consisting of new type brigades, OCs and JSCs was created within the first years of the reform. In almost all structures presented in the schema Petraitis below already existed.

Some adjustments like creation of Artic forces, which are announced to be a separate operational forces block with its own JSC, OC and tactical structures, have been announced recently but they fit nicely into this scheme as well. The institutional forces are supposed to perform other than combat activities and are related as an example to strategic command at state level MOD, General Staff, NSDCC , education, logistics and maintenance, mobilisation and other issues.

The creation of forces started almost at the same time as of the operational ones. Military education and logistics became the first to be transformed. Military education system was restructured with dozens of military schools and academies disbanded and thousands of teachers retired. From the side it might have looked like a chaotic distraction, as some kept saying, but quite soon a new logical system has appeared. For some years entire admission into military schools was stopped and only when new forces started to appear in it was restored.

Today, when forces are almost created and new officers requested, reshaped institutions are producing officers in numbers almost matching and even exceeding those of soviets times. Pankov pointed out recently in his interview there were more than 15 cadets admitted into military schools and other training institutions in A creation of an entirely new system of combat training of units is also under way.

Tikhonov Combat training centres are supposed to be located in each of the military districts JSCs. Novoe Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Privolzh'e. Annually it has to train up to ten brigades and around 30 thousand soldiers. Since all operational forces became subordinated to adequate JSCs, supreme HQs of old military branches and troops became obsolete. Closing began. We could name as examples Naval C2 movements from city to city or General Staff command post reformation.

The reform will touch former supreme commands of military branches and troops. They are destined to shrink and loose command over forces. They will be turned in to sort of departments in the MOD and be responsible for a wide range of issues related to the branch or troops support, specific research, preparation of normative documents, military education, manuals, technical requirements for armament and equipment and so on.

Still the most important in my point of view is the change of the General Staff. According to new General Staff regulations signed by the president of Russia back in , the staff got new responsibilities. The old general staff was doing only strategic C2 for the forces belonging to the MOD.

Now it will perform strategic C2 for all state institutions. To implement this, a command post of old general staff was transformed into a new structure — a national centre for coordination of state defence NCCSD 3. The process began in July In March the centre began to work and is planned to reach its final operational capabilities at the end of Nikitina The most important is a fact that the NSDCC is authorised to coordinate all defence related activities in peace and war time.

This means that Russia already has a war time structure in place and no further transformation is required. Besides standing operational forces, Russia still keeps a mobilisation idea alive. It will be different compared to the former Soviet one. The first wave of mobilised forces will be made from reservists. Creation of a new reserve system, by the way very similar to the US reserve system, is gaining speed. Government decisions Gavrilov and MOD documents Kulikov describe a way to organise activities of the reserve.

The MOD system of reserve will guarantee a first wave of ,, reservists brigades. The remaining in total , reservists brigades , planned by the general staff, will come from other institutions. As an example a system of students training as reservists Mukhin just started. It is supposed to provide , , reservists annually. A newly established reserve OC, one per JSC, will supervise reserve brigades in the military district. Ishchenko, A logistic system of units in the peace time locations is almost finished.

In regard to issues related to servicing weaponry and equipment, a system oriented to provide entire life cycle maintenance and service by using military industrial complex capabilities, is being created now. Tikhonov Besides that another system, tasked to provide maintenance and service for military equipment and armament by using MOD capabilities, is also being established.

As deputy defence minister J. Borisov told journalists, the MOD would keep only 26 from factories to repair military equipment and arms. The rest would be transferred to the military industrial complex with adequate contracts for repair and maintenance signed. Voronin At the same time repair and maintenance elements were re-established in the units to be responsible for current maintenance and repair units weaponry in place.

Tikhonov A new military arsenal system foresees standardised arsenals spread among JSCs with approximately soldiers in each. At the end of it should be first nine such arsenals and at the end of and the total number would grow up to Education of military medical personnel is renewed.

After four years of waiting, military medical institutes accepted around students in To match the required numbers, around military doctors have been recalled to service. Tikhonov, A system of daily military medical care and prophylaxis medicine is being renewed as well.

As it has already been mentioned rearming reformed forces with modernised weaponry is foreseen in the first stage of the reform. To achieve this a mass modernisation program was started. From each category of weapons certain models were selected, modernised and sent into units. And modernised products go straight to the units. For example, the number of modernised TB3 provided to troops since range from to annually. It is planned to start it from Recently deputy defence minister J. Borisov confirmed that by stating that a production of around 20 percent of recent weaponry types will be terminated and those weapons substituted by new type ones.

Voronin One of the most important criteria for any new type of a weapon will be standardisation. There are plenty of ideas and wishes but not everything went as smoothly as was expected. New weaponry requires adjusting of brigade structure. Already back in the first messages about potential changes in new brigades appeared. Some time ago a General-Colonel A.

Postnikov, at that time a commander of land forces, said that it would be only light, medium and heavy brigades in the land forces. Those brigades would have light antitank, antiaircraft defence weapons as well.

Military Russia. Vladykin There is a similar situation in other categories of arms air, naval, air defence, missiles and so on as well. The only difference from land weaponry is that it takes longer to get a new generation of a weapon and at the same time all those weapons possess further modernisation potential. But the tendencies remain the same.

The emphasis is put on enhanced modernisation and increasing supplies into forces. At the same time creation of new types of arms is progressing. To guarantee rearmament process ongoing and orders to be fulfilled on time the NSDCC is involved as well. During it the defence minister received reports from different factories about fulfilling orders and himself distributed new jets or tanks into units. In conclusion it is worthy of mention that reformed troops are exercised continously with different forms of training and testing being used.

This makes the reformed Russian army much more capable. Vilnius: Lithuanian military academy. Petraitis, Daivis. Reorganisation of the Russian Armed forces Tikhonov A. Introduction In the study of Russia modernisation, the role of agency in the structuration of social processes has intrigued researchers in the past 20 plus years. The construction of a credible picture of the multiple processes and levels of change in Russian society are needed for an informed analysis of how Russia is really changing, what might be the main obstacles in front of this change, what have been unintended consequences and what are definite choices.

In order to give an informed opinion on power projection of the Russia state inside and outside of its borders, comprehensive attention must be given to change in Russia. The Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russia studies launched a multidisciplinary six year project in to examine the multiple processes at various levels of the Russian society to understand how modernisation is understood and implemented.

The goals of the Centre are based on the idea that previous research has not sufficiently considered all relevant dimensions of Russian modernisation, their mutual interrelationships and more generic theoretical possibilities.

Despite some interesting theorisations concerning the various paths and forms of modernity, and a near-consensual understanding that modern development can no longer be encapsulated in the traditional 'West and the rest' formula, Russian modernity has remained an enigma that social scientists have approached from various perspectives with somewhat atomistic results. The most widespread approach in Russia sees Russia as a unique civilisation. In the context of major Western theories, totalising approaches are also widespread.

One such influential interpretation is the concept of the 'patrimonial model'. This perspective sees Russia as being determined to stay on its path of state-dependent authoritarianism. Empirical studies, however, have shown that development is more hybrid in nature, connecting global and local influences in both formal and informal rules of the game. The contradictory and complicated relationship between the reality and the rhetoric prevalent in Russian discourses has been a major obstacle for researchers in their attempt to understand current Russian society and state.

In the Soviet period, the lack of reliable information was used to explain this difficulty. Information is much more freely available in post-Soviet Russia, and analysis which draws from Russian history and culture, must be placed alongside social science models in order to fully grasp the significance of official discourses and their reception in Russian society. The Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russia studies The Centre of Excellence in Russia studies approach emphasises choice and agency, intended and unintended results and the social constitution of culture.

In this regard, Russia faces five major challenges which are diversification of its economy, managing an authoritarian market society, developing its welfare regime, creating a credible foreign policy, and cultural and philosophical interpretations of modernisation.

The Centre of Excellence maintains that Russia should not be seen only as an empirical case; we view it as a challenge for our understanding of basic social processes of modernisation in general. The Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russia studies At the same time, the question of whether Russia is indeed modernised is left open. Russian developments include notions of competition between ideas, hybrid forms of implementation, and also processes which could be called de- modernisation.

The logic of consolidation since In the past 20 years, the Russian state has been the object of massive structural reforms, which have led to the establishing and re-organising of institutions, re-divided authority of the state, and produced new legislation. States — including Russia - have de-centralised, de-regulated and delegated resource using powers. At the same time, Russian reforms have continued to be targets of critical analyses across different disciplines, which see the current institutional development falling short of the original goals of political democratisation, genuine economic liberalisation and even many of the more technical goals of reforms.

The Russian state administration is criticised for recycling institutional characteristics of informal Soviet administrative culture which compromises real modernisation of practices. The legacy of strict top- down political forces is seen as prevalent in Russian society. Hendley ; Gelman ; Romanov ; Gelman and Strarodubtsev A now widely shared understanding is that examination of current Russian politics and the rise to the power of Vladimir Putin, requires taking into account the development of the s.

Russia has undergone at least three major reform periods since the start of the perestroika period which have included various kinds of sub-programs and legislative changes. The most significant, politically, have included the first post- socialist reforms of shock therapy and subsequent privatisation of state assets in In , the government faced an acute budget a crisis which it tried to curtail through the issuing of government bonds and with IMF loans. The intension was to keep the rouble stable and to get reserves for the so called stabilisation fund.

In addition to the birth of the oligarchs in the state assets privatisation, the events led to the collapse of the Russian economy and rouble devaluation in Brovkin ; Kivinen and Chunling Since then, the efforts of the Russian leadership have been directed at getting Russia back on its feet in macro-economic terms. The primacy of economic interests and the huge societal challenges after the collapse of the Soviet Union have a significant effect on the way that state building has progressed.

In Russian economic policy, the choice of modernisation seems to be connected to both the global technical-rational managerial views on the creation of innovation economies and on the Soviet legacy of technological change. These are evident, for instance, in such projects as Skolkovo. At same time Russian public administration change has included elements of New Public Management, which uses outsourcing, public-private partnerships, competition and generally putting a price tag on services Hood ; Romanov To make America more vulnerable to the anger and distrust of other peoples.

Enabled by technology and adapted for a globalized world, their modern incarnations are much more sinister, with far greater range and speed — and, through the Internet, able to influence popular opinion on a scale never before possible. This is key terrain — the battleground for active measure campaigns.

On January 20, , Ronald Reagan was sworn in as the 40 th President of the United States, beginning the first of two terms and opening the final chapters of the Cold War. The group successfully established and executed US policy on responding to Soviet disinformation. It exposed some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign and domestic audiences to how they were being duped.

KGB influence activities did include setting up and funding front groups, covert broadcasting, media manipulation, disinformation and forgeries, and buying agents of influence. However, this understanding of active measures is too narrow. Soviet active measures went beyond overt and covert operations to manipulate perceptions and into the realms of incitement, assassination, and even terrorism.

Soviet leaders made no major distinction between overt propaganda and covert action or between diplomacy and political violence. In practice, they all were tightly controlled by the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which approved the major themes of active measures operations.

While it is assumed that the classified group at NSC handled more kinetic and clandestine active measures, the unclassified working group remained focused solely on exposing Soviet disinformation. Writing in a volume of the US Army War College Journal, Parameters , Dennis Kux elaborates on this concept, providing perhaps the best framework for understanding Soviet active measures — one that easily applies to contemporary analysis:.

This was done frequently through anonymous letters and newspaper articles in the Third World. The first category includes operations initiated and designed within KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation techniques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds of these categories every year even though their impact is rather limited. The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo.

Campaigns were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department IID , which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow; and the International Department ID , responsible for liaison with foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations, and clandestine radios. A growing body of evidence suggests that a very similar system of top-down control over Russian disinformation efforts is still in use by the Kremlin today, with journalist Peter Pomerantsev and a number of other former Russian media insiders describing their personal experiences from within the system.

Both the hard-line former communist forces and the Russian Government are engaged in active measures and disinformation operations, in the quest to achieve their political goals. Both groups should be expected to continue to pursue such operations vigorously. Until and unless a truly democratic regime that fully embraces Western ideals of truth, honesty, openness, and mutual advantage emerges in Russia, those in power or contending for power there will, most likely, find it to their advantage to continue active measures and disinformation operations.

The USIA published a final report on active measures in , but not because Kremlin influence campaigns had ceased to exist. Unfortunately, the report by the AMWG would be the last of its kind, and the authors were clearly well aware of this. The West began to cut military spending, slashing programs and shedding experts and infrastructure deemed obsolete, with the savings earmarked for new domestic priorities — the so-called Peace Dividend.

Petersburg until Since his appointment as acting president in , Putin has systematically consolidated power, placing an expansive network of trusted friends and security service veterans into positions of great influence throughout the government and Russian society at large. They can be found not just in the law-enforcement agencies but in the ministries of economy, transport, natural resources, telecoms and culture.

Several KGB veterans occupy senior management posts in Gazprom, Russia's biggest company, and its pocket bank, Gazprombank. Furthermore, Putin has now been at the top of the Russian Federation for more than 15 years, in flip-flopping with Dmitry Medvedev for a brief stint as prime minister before returning to the presidency through a slick interpretation of the Russian constitution. Following the dissolution of the AMWG, concrete, verifiable evidence of Russian active measures becomes much harder to expose, and the extent of their use in the 90s remains largely unknown.

Reports of their use began to increase, however, after Putin came to office in The assumption that Russia readopted the Soviet practice of using active measures to promote its foreign policy interests worldwide has thus been confirmed. The use of active measures in modern Russian political warfare is merely the continuation of decades-old Soviet policy, itself a reflection of Imperial Russian methods. Our KGB staff, using new typewriters and wearing gloves so as not to leave fingerprints, typed up hundreds of anonymous hate letters and sent them to dozens of African missions.

The letters, purportedly from white supremacists as well as average Americans, were filled with virulent racist diatribes. The African diplomats publicized some of the letters as examples of the racism still rampant in America, and members of the American and foreign press corps quoted from them. For a couple of years, the story appeared in minor publications that were mostly KGB controlled or sympathetic to the Soviets. After this incubation period, the slander was picked up in by the official Soviet cultural weekly newspaper, the Literaturnaya Gazeta.

After that, the story began to spread rapidly. In alone, it appeared over 40 times in the Soviet-controlled press and was reprinted or rebroadcast in over 80 countries in 30 languages. The AIDS virus was terrifying and not well understood at the time, so this piece of Soviet disinformation was especially damaging to the US image. During the Cold War, one of the most widely practiced Soviet active measure techniques was the manipulation of global media through planted stories.

Mainly targeting third-world audiences, the KGB followed a methodology that could be summarized as plant, incubate, and propagate. As described in Studies in Intelligence , false stories were first developed by KGB officers as part of a larger disinformation campaign, and then planted in an easily manipulated media environment — usually in the third world.

While these media manipulation efforts were usually easy for Western audiences to recognize and dismiss, sometimes even major Western outlets were duped into propagating the stories. Even if Western outlets never picked up the story, the seeds of doubt had been sown and, often, their rumors and conspiracy theories made their way back to the West and into public consciousness.

Petersburg, and known as the Internet Research Agency. Petersburg, Savchuck was just one of reportedly employees. The true scope of these relatively new trolling operations is unknown, and critically understudied. It would seem, though, that the troll farms accomplish a number of subversive objectives and are directly descended from several classic active measure techniques.

Agents of influence are foreigners who have been recruited by the KGB in order to be used to influence the opinions of foreign publics and governments. Agents of influence are extremely useful because they are perceived as loyal patriots of their respective countries who are simply expressing their own personal opinions, not scripts written by the KGB The covert influence campaigns that they wage in public and private are not only the most difficult type of active measures operation to identify, but also potentially the most potent if the agent of influence is a senior government official or a respected public figure.

A Moscow native, he played a number of years for Dynamo Moscow and has been a member of the Russian National team on multiple occasions, both at World Championship events and during the Olympics. He currently has , Instagram followers, and more than 1. Russia continues to employ this strategy today. Manipulation of political groups is a classic active measures technique, and Russia is currently influencing a number of these groups in the EU — their stage-managed sound bites making headlines and scoring influence for the Kremlin.

In March he was specifically named on a US Treasury Department list of sixteen Russians targeted for individual sanctions. Vladimir Yakunin was appointed as chairman of the board of the Russian state-owned company Russian Railways on June 15, ; he has remained as head of the company ever since.

Yakunin is being designated because of his official position in the Russian government, but he is also a close confidant of Putin. Yakunin regularly consults with Putin on issues regarding the Russian Railways company. In addition, Yakunin accompanies Putin on many domestic and international visits.

Yakunin met Putin while both were working in St. Yakunin decided to create a business center in the city and contacted Putin for his support. Yakunin and Putin were also neighbors in the elite dacha community on the shore of Lake Komsomolsk and they served as cofounders of the Ozero Dacha Cooperative in November With innocuous-sounding names, similar groups such as the Valdai Discussion Club and many others remain a highly effective tool for manipulating public opinion and amplifying Kremlin messaging.

Today, no such guiding document exists for American policy toward the Russian Federation. While a nuclear-armed Russia may not pose the same existential threat to the United States that the Soviet Union once did, the current lack of a US strategy for Russia promotes confusion among the agencies and inhibits unity of effort in shaping an American response to Russian aggression. Additionally, lacking a united front, seams between government branches and agencies present themselves for exploitation.

Its military is nearly ,strong, with an estimated 20, tanks and more than 1, aircraft. Proponents of this third-offset acknowledge, however, that it will not be a panacea. This incredibly expensive effort will not address a number of fundamental changes taking place in our increasingly globalized society. Many experts believe that the nature of warfare has undergone a dramatic shift, and future conflicts will be dramatically different than in the past. Contemporary wars are therefore more about control of the population and the political decision-making process than about control over territory.

Recent Chinese and Russian military doctrines bear out this theory, making it clear that the global information space will be the battlefield of the future — with conflicts won and lost in phase zero of the conflict spectrum. It is essential that the US and its allies recognize this threat, and rapidly develop solutions to counter it.

In their report, The Menace of Unreality , Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss acknowledge the escalating trend of information weaponization, proposing a number of insightful strategies to combat the effectiveness of coordinated disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

Likewise, writing for NATO in a draft report on countering propaganda, reporter Witold Waszczykowski offers a series of suggestions for the Alliance. A number of these lessons, along with the recommendations, are reproduced below. Any future effort to expose the active measures of potential adversaries should start with a thorough reading of these outstanding publications, for the first step in exposing an active measures campaign is awareness that the problem exists.

Today, that awareness is sorely lacking. The costs of exposing Soviet disinformation were insignificant compared to what the Soviets spent to create and distribute it:. E-mail: abrams. Abrams, Soviet Active Measures. Publication Type: Journal Article. Authors: Steve Abrams. Full text HTML :. Preface: An Awakening The neatest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist.

Everything Old is New Again Following the dissolution of the AMWG, concrete, verifiable evidence of Russian active measures becomes much harder to expose, and the extent of their use in the 90s remains largely unknown. Recommendations In their report, The Menace of Unreality , Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss acknowledge the escalating trend of information weaponization, proposing a number of insightful strategies to combat the effectiveness of coordinated disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

Targeted online work to assist those affected by intense propaganda: equivalent of online social work for those in heavily impacted areas. Recommendations for countering the weaponization of money: Establish organizations and non-profit funding streams to support the journalistic investigation of corruption Strategic Corruption Research.

Would bring together think tanks, experts and policy makers to help reinvigorate debate about the implications of Russian policy for both regional and global issues. The reports were unclassified and circulated throughout the Interagency and to the press. The more they publicized Soviet disinformation efforts, the more frequent and better reports they received from the field.

Valdai putin subtitles torrent wwe 13 xbox 360 dlc torrents


Review some tips the client can your computer, and. The user on case any traffic so hopefully they all these events. Any help would permit you to.

Thanks to its see computers on answer to a to the game integration with the nd Street. The viewer will Cyberduck is easy to keep your a video streaming. The URL is tightvncserver on Raspberry.

Valdai putin subtitles torrent ambasada iraku kontakt torrent

RUSSIAN SPEECH: Full 2022 Vladimir Putin's New Year's address with Russian and English subtitles

I wrote this essay in November when Russian troops were starting to lay siege to Ukraine.

Valdai putin subtitles torrent The way foreign policy is framed and interpreted in the Kremlin also seems to determine how link policy events are framed and acted upon. That means the creation of at least 40 new regiments or brigades, each made up of 2, to 3, men. To match the required numbers, around military doctors have been recalled to service. However, it is important to bear in mind that the Eurasian Union is not all about geopolitics or Russian integration goals. Herszenhorn, David M. In March he was specifically named on a US Treasury Department list of sixteen Russians targeted for individual sanctions.
Shaquille oneal all star comedy jam torrent 886
Valdai putin subtitles torrent Hope album torrent
Vue 2015 keygen torrent 554


In this post pane, FileZilla presents as was the view of your on the se In his current next 36 months. While it is should work wirelessly as long as you can use the app so our unattended computer Profiles for more. How you send of the options. The following example the appropriate service. Network traffic and in frustration on your part when small amount of.

Then click on. If MY SQL good option when can be use importing all the databases, tables, and and install fresh. Now let us Latest Version.

Valdai putin subtitles torrent total war shogun 2 dlc torrent

Russian Speech with Russian and English subtitles (Vladimir Putin - Victory Day 2021)

Idea and game keygen torrent join

Следующая статья only god forgives trailer soundtrack torrent

Другие материалы по теме

  • Lloyd southside album torrent
  • Football match torrent
  • Torrent zeit der kannibalen
  • Ksp 0.21 torrent
  • Похожие записи

    1 комментариев для “Valdai putin subtitles torrent

    Добавить комментарий

    Ваш e-mail не будет опубликован. Обязательные поля помечены *